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Abstract 
Our optimal control model identifies economic reasons as to why several farmland bird populations 
have dramatically declined in modern agricultural landscapes. By integrating bird fauna values into 
decision-making on cereal crop choice, herbicide use and hunting bag size, we derive those economic 
instruments needed for enhancing biodiversity on farmland and reversing the decline of grey partridge 
(Perdix perdix) populations. Based on the Finnish data available, we illustrate how the optimal acreage 
subsidy for organically-grown rye areas, the herbicide tax rate and the grey partridge hunting licence 
fee could be estimated in monetary terms. The procedure to derive and value the first-best policy 
instruments is applicable for various components of agri-environmental schemes implemented 
throughout the European Union. 
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1. Introduction 
The positive environmental benefits of agriculture include preservation of such public goods as 
farmland biodiversity and agricultural landscapes. In spite of this, agricultural intensification and 
specialisation, along with the decline of livestock farming have clearly caused the loss of wildlife 
habitats. An alarming indicator for the state of biodiversity in cereal ecosystems is the decreasing 
abundance of farmland birds. In particular, the grey partridge (Perdix perdix), a game bird of open 
arable landscapes which lives mainly in cereal crops, has been adversely affected by the intensification 
of agriculture throughout Europe. This is significant because more than any other bird species, the 
grey partridge can be considered to be an indicator of biodiversity in cereal ecosystems (Potts, 1986; 
Hagemeijer and Blair, 1997; Pimentel and Greiner, 1997; Potts, 1997; Sotherton, 1998; Chamberlain 
and Fuller, 2000; Heath and Rayment, 2003; De Leo et al., 2004). 
  As rapid changes in land use curtail environmental benefits, effective measures to conserve 
wildlife in agricultural areas become necessary (e.g., Lowe and Whitby, 1997; Weersink et al. 1998; 
Hanley and Oglethorpe, 1999). To date, the pricing of biodiversity has focused on the valuation of 
individual species using contingent valuation (CV) and other methods of stated preferences (Loomis 
and White, 1996; Montgomery et al., 1999). In this paper, we address the positive and negative effects 
of cereals cultivation and the associated economic costs of environmentally benign agricultural 
practices. We utilise the grey partridge stock as a biodiversity indicator for illustrating the effects of 
cereal crops and herbicides the farmers choose to use. We also take into account hunters’ recreational 
hunting decisions, and the fact that the partridge stock provides welfare beyond recreational hunting. 
The primary purpose of this study is to demonstrate how to derive and value in monetary terms those 
policy instruments needed for adopting required environmental measures and agricultural practices to 
produce socially optimal amounts of commodity and non-commodity outputs of agriculture. 
  There is an extensive and increasing volume of literature concerning agri-environmental schemes 
and policies for multifunctional agriculture (e.g., Peterson et al., 2002; Lankoski and Ollikainen, 2003; 
Dobbs and Pretty, 2004). In addition, aspects of biodiversity preservation and wildlife management in 
agriculture are increasingly considered in the analyses (e.g., Wossink et al., 1999; Bulte and Horan, 
2003; van Wenum et al., 2004). However, there are only a few economic studies analysing the 
dynamics of bird species in this context despite the wide use of farmland birds as biodiversity 
indicators. The most closely related approach to ours originates from the study by Hammack and 
Brown (1974) who investigated the optimal allocation of the prairie wetlands in North America. They 
analysed the conflicting economic and ecological interests when the drainage of marshes and ponds 
increases the supply of arable land, and eliminates the costs of tilling around potholes, but at the same 
time decreases the nesting areas and the stock of waterfowl. The studies of Hyde (1989) and 
Montgomery et al. (1994) construct marginal cost curves of forest bird species and treat abundance of   3
birds as an alternative of timber production. Our modelling owes much to the inspiring work of 
Hammack and Brown, and to other studies on unpriced environmental input where the ecological 
function affects the growth rate of a renewable stock over time (e.g. a wetland supporting a fishery as 
outlined in Barbier and Strand, 1998, and Barbier, 2000; see also Ellis and Fisher, 1987). The main 
contribution of our application is on elaborating economic incentives to achieve the socially optimal 
level of farmland biodiversity and corresponding input uses in cereals crop production. 
  In our framework, the environmental externalities lead to a socially inefficient allocation of arable 
land, excess use of herbicides and over-exploitation of partridge stock, since private valuations of 
inputs and outputs are different from their social valuations. We develop the first-best policy 
instruments to internalise bird fauna values in the economic decision-making of farmers and hunters. 
The results of our empirical illustration show that government intervention can be justified even with 
conservative value estimates of game birds. 
  The paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we introduce some background 
information on grey partridges, recreational hunting and cultivation of cereals in Finland. In the third 
section, we develop a framework of cereals cultivation and partridge hunting, and study how the 
government may intervene optimally by subsidising organic crop farming, taxing herbicide use and 
imposing a hunting licence fee in such a way that the externalities are internalised. In the fourth 
section, we provide an empirical illustration of the use of biodiversity values in the design of 
individual policy measures. We also value the socially optimal policy measures in monetary terms. 
Concluding remarks are provided in the last section. The applied framework and produced empirical 
results give useful insights into the ongoing process of shaping policies to implement and improve 
agri-environmental schemes in the European Union (EU). 
 
2. Background 
European grey partridge populations have declined remarkably since the 1930s, and the bird is 
currently listed among species with an unfavourable conservation status (Potts, 1986; De Leo et al., 
2004). If no additional measures are taken, it is predicted that the current agricultural policies will lead 
to further decline in the species. In Finland, the grey partridge is classified as a near-threatened species 
(Rassi et al., 2001). The present size of the breeding population is only 4,000 pairs. In the 1950s, the 
breeding population size was estimated to be 15,000 pairs (Väisänen et al., 1998). The reasons for the 
decline of the species in Finland include reductions in the area under winter cereals as well as adverse 
effects of agricultural pesticides, which decrease the supply of insect food and increase chick mortality 
(Tiainen and Pakkala, 1996). 
  In Finland, there are nearly 300,000 registered hunters, 6% of the whole Finnish population 
(Hunters’ Central Organisation, 2005). Hunters belong to hunting clubs which lease land and water   4
areas for hunting. Leases are often nominal. Land owners and hunting clubs grant or sell hunting 
permits for areas in their possession. For state-owned lands, hunting permits are sold by the Finnish 
Forest and Park Service. In northernmost Finland, local inhabitants have free hunting rights on public 
lands. Game populations are regulated using closed seasons, and hunting is scaled in accordance with 
game stocks. There are regional restrictions on grey partridge hunting which is concentrated in 
western Finland. According to statistics produced by the Finnish Game and Fisheries Research 
Institute (2004), the size of the annual grey partridge bag has been approximately 1,000 kg (2,000 
birds) in the past twenty years. 
  In the EU, rye is cultivated mainly in Poland and Germany. In Finland, rye is a winter cereal and 
its shoots provide grey partridges, pheasants and brown hares with vegetation during winter and early 
spring (Lindén et al., 1996). In contrast to central and western Europe, winter cereal fields in Finland 
provide better habitats for farmland birds than spring cereal fields (Piha et al., 2003). This is because 
the vegetation in Finnish winter cereal fields is sparse and low during the breeding season of birds. In 
addition, rye is suitable for organic farming in which chemical pesticides and fertilisers are not used at 
all. In 2002, over 20% of Finland's rye area was organically farmed (Plant Production Inspection 
Centre, 2003). Also the need for herbicides in conventionally farmed rye fields is smaller than, for 
example, in spring wheat fields, because winter cereal fields have fewer weeds than spring cereal or 
hay fields (Raatikainen et al., 1978). This benefits the environment, since herbicides also reduce the 
availability of food for invertebrates and birds. 
  Although the cultivation of rye provides several environmental benefits as described above, 
Finnish farmers typically incur relatively high opportunity costs if they cultivate rye. This is because 
the producer price for rye has not been significantly higher compared to prices for other cereals, and 
the per-hectare yields in rye production have been smaller than, for example, in spring wheat 
production. Furthermore, the risk of crop failure is higher in winter cereal production than in spring 
cereal production. Since those farmers who cultivate rye bear the costs of producing positive 
environmental effects but do not share the benefits, they do not have an economic incentive to 
cultivate rye. The lack of incentives reduces the rye area and may also decrease crop diversity, bird 
densities and hunters’ grey partridge bags. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the arable area under rye in 
Finland in past decades has typically been less than 3% of the total cereal area (Information Centre of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2003). Furthermore, as a result of the Common Agricultural 
Policy reform, agreed on June 2003 in Luxembourg, rye will be excluded from the intervention system 
of the EU (Council, 2003). According to Lehtonen et al. (2004), this will make rye a relatively 
unprofitable cereal to cultivate in Finland if no other production-linked support for rye is established. 
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3. Analytical framework 
In this section, we introduce a theoretical framework for cereals production and grey partridge 
hunting. First, we study the underlying assumptions, find the social and private optima of arable land 
allocation, farm capital investments, herbicide use and partridge hunting bag. Then we develop the 
first-best policy instruments to internalise the externalities. 
  Let us assume that the total area of homogenous agricultural land in the economy is A, which is a 
constant upper limit on land for farming in the long run. Agricultural land is allocated between two 
bread grain cereal crops. Crop 1 is organically-grown rye and crop 2 is spring wheat. Both variables 
are functions of continuous time, but we suppress the time argument (t) and denote the area devoted to 
crop 1 by  1 a  and the area devoted to crop 2 by  . 2 a  By assuming that all fixed amounts of agricultural 
land are used at any time, we have  . 2 1 A a a = +  This assumption implies that the price or rental value 
of farmland will be captured by the Lagrangian multiplier for the arable land constraint in the 
optimisation problem. 
  Sector-specific know-how and physical and human capital invested in the chosen agricultural 
technology, organic or conventional, is denoted by  i K  (i = 1,2). The production function of organic 
crop 1,  ), , ( 1 1 1 K a f y =  is assumed to be strictly concave with respect to  1 a  and  1 K . The production 
function of conventional crop 2,  ), , , ( 2 2 2 h K a g y =  contains three arguments. The last of these, h, 
represents the amount of herbicides used in weed control. The marginal products of all three inputs are 
assumed to be positive and diminishing. 
  In both agricultural sectors, capital formation and (gross) investment,  i I , are related by the 
following differential equation 
 
) 2 , 1 ( = − = i K I K i i i δ &  
 
where  , /dt dK K i i = &  and δ represents the constant depreciation rate of capital. The cost of an 
investment is denoted by  ) ( i
I I c
i  which is an increasing function of sector-specific investment, i.e. 
0 ) ( / ) ( > ⋅ ≡ ∂ ∂
i
i
i I
I i i
I c I I c  and  0 ) ( / ) (
2 2 > ⋅ ≡ ∂ ∂
i
i i
i I
I I i i
I c I I c . Furthermore, farmers are assumed to operate 
in competitive product and factor markets, and we denote the market price of crop 1 by  ,
1 p  the market 
price of crop 2 by  ,
2 p  and the unit price of herbicide by  .
h p  
  The application of herbicides in agriculture may expose humans to poisonings and related 
illnesses. The (direct) adverse effects of herbicides are denoted by D(h), and we assume that  0 ) ( > ⋅ h D  
and . 0 ) ( > ⋅ hh D  The social costs of herbicide use in agriculture to human well-being may also include   6
consumers’ disutility from the potential risk of herbicide residues in food, water and the atmosphere 
(Pimentel and Greiner, 1997). 
  The partridge stock is replenished by growth which depends positively on the size of the partridge 
population, B, and the area under organic rye (crop 1) and negatively on the amount of herbicides 
used. The bird stock is reduced by the amount of partridges shot, X. The variable also measures the 
amount of partridge bag, since we assume that the proportion of birds shot but not retrieved is 
negligible. The parameter α measures the constant natural mortality rate of grey partridges. The 
relationships above can be summarised as 
 
B X h a B e B α − − = ) , , ( 1 &  
 
where  ) (⋅ e  denotes the natural production function with  , 0 ) ( > ⋅ B e   , 0 ) (
1 > ⋅ a e  and  . 0 ) ( < ⋅ h e  
  We assume that hunters generate their own recreational hunting experience. The total hunting 
value of a bagged grey partridge consists mainly of recreational benefits that are typically much larger 
than the value of meat received from the hunting bag. The benefits of hunting, net of hunting costs, are 
given by R(X) so that  0 ) ( > ⋅ X R  and  . 0 ) ( < ⋅ XX R  
  Since many people who do not hunt may value and derive utility from the continued presence of 
partridges, we assume that the partridge stock provides welfare above and beyond hunting. The non-
use values attached to the stock of partridges are given in monetary units by the function W(B). We 
assume that  0 ) ( > ⋅ B W  and  . 0 ) ( < ⋅ BB W  
 
3.1 Social planner’s problem 
The objective of the social planner is to maximise discounted social welfare by allocating the arable 
area between cereals optimally, finding the optimal investments and choosing the optimal amounts of 
herbicide used and partridges shot, i.e. 
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∞
− + + − − − − +
0
2 1 2 2
2
1 1
1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , ( ) , ( Max
2 1 dt e B W X R h D h p I c I c h K a g p K a f p
t h I I ρ
) 2 , 1 ( 0 ) 0 ( to subject 0 = > = − = i K K K I K i i i i i δ &  
0 ) 0 ( ) , , ( 0 1 > = − − = B B B X h a B e B α &  
A a a = + 2 1 and  
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  In the above optimal control problem, ρ (≥ 0) is the rate of discount,  0 i K  (i = 1,2) refers to the 
initial stock of sector-specific farm capital, and  0 B  denotes the given initial size of the partridge 
population. 
  The current-value Lagrangian function (i.e. the current-value Hamiltonian augmented with the 
constraint  A a a = + 2 1 ) is 
 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , ( ) , ( 2 1 2 2
2
1 1
1 2 1 B W X R h D h p I c I c h K a g p K a f p
h I I
c + + − − − − + = l  
[] [ ] [ ] [ ] 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 ) , , ( a a A n B X h a B e m K I l K I l − − + − − + − + − + α δ δ  
 
where  i l  (i = 1,2) is the shadow price of sector-specific capital, m is the shadow price of partridge 
stock B, and the Lagrangian multiplier n is the shadow price of arable land A. 
  The maximum-principle conditions are 
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including the equations of motion for the state and the costate variables 
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plus the infinite-horizon transversality conditions (Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987) 
 
) 0 ) ( lim if , 0 ( 0 ) ( lim and ) 0 ) ( lim if , 0 ( 0 ) ( lim ), 0 ) ( lim if , 0 ( 0 ) ( lim 2 2 1 1 > = ≥ > = ≥ > = ≥
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  We assume interior solutions and focus on their interpretation. Rearranging the first two 
maximum-principle conditions (equations (1) and (2)) yields the following socially optimal arable land 
allocation 
 
) ( ) ( ) (
2 1 1
2 1 ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ a a a g p me f p  
 
Thus at the social optimum, when both cereals are cultivated, the sum of the values of marginal 
products of arable area devoted to the production of crop 1 and grey partridges is equal to the value of 
the marginal product of arable land under crop 2. 
  In both sectors, equation (3) directs increasing human capital, machinery and building 
investments to the point where the marginal adjustment cost is equal to the sector-specific shadow 
price of capital. Equation (4) shows that, at the social optimum, the value of marginal product of 
herbicide used – net of the marginal social damages done and partridge growth loss incurred – equals 
the unit price of herbicide, i.e., the marginal cost. Equation (5) implicates that the social planner 
should increase the hunting bag to the point where the marginal net benefits of recreational hunting are 
equal to the marginal current value of an additional partridge. 
  According to equation (6), the steady state for farm capital stocks is characterised by the equality 
of sector-specific investment and sector-specific capital depreciation. Respectively, when  , 0 / = dt dB  
equation (7) can be written as  , ) ( B X e α + = ⋅  implicating simply that the biological growth and 
reduction rates of the partridge stock are equal in the steady state. Furthermore, when  0 / 1 = dt dl  
), 0 / ( 2 = dt dl  the equation of motion for the costate variable  1 l  ) ( 2 l  can be written as 
) ( ) (
1
1
1 ⋅ = + K f p l ρ δ  ( ) ) ( ) (
2
2
2 ⋅ = + K g p l ρ δ  implicating that the marginal user cost of sector-specific 
capital should be equal to the value of the marginal product of sector-specific capital. Finally, when 
, 0 / = dt dm  equation (10) can be solved for m, i.e. 
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which implicates that in the steady state the shadow price of partridge stock, m, is equal to the ratio 
between the marginal contribution of partridge stock to current social welfare,  ), (⋅ B W  and the marginal 
contribution of partridge stock to future social welfare,  ). (⋅ − + B e α ρ  From (5) we have  ). (⋅ = X R m  If 
we make this substitution into equation (10), we have in the optimal steady state 
 
α ρ α ρ +
⋅
+
+
⋅ ⋅
= ⋅
) ( ) ( ) (
) ( B X B
X
W R e
R   (11)
 
The left-hand side of the equation (11) can be considered as the marginal opportunity cost of not 
hunting. The right-hand side consists of the marginal incentives to postpone hunting, which include 
partridge capital gains,  ), ( ) ( ⋅ ⋅ X B R e  and the marginal welfare effect of the increased partridge stock, 
). (⋅ B W  Because of the accumulation phenomenon, the instantaneous marginal incentives have to be 
discounted by dividing with the sum of the rate of discount and the natural mortality rate of grey 
partridges,  . α ρ +  
  Equation (11) can be solved for the rate of discount 
 
) (
) (
) (
⋅
⋅
+ − ⋅ =
X
B
B R
W
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The equation (12) states that the rate of discount equals the own rate of return of the partridge stock. 
The latter has two components: the net marginal productivity of the resource stock,  , ) ( α − ⋅ B e  and the 
marginal stock effect,  ), ( / ) ( ⋅ ⋅ X B R W  which consist of increased social welfare from the stock benefits. 
Thus, the hunting rate is socially optimal when the net product of the partridge stock is equal to the 
discount rate. Along with  , ) ( B e x α − ⋅ =  equation (12) defines the modified-golden-rule value of the 
socially optimal steady-state partridge stock. 
 
3.2 Representative farmer’s private optimum 
In this section, we consider a representative farmer whose objective is to maximise profit from the 
cultivation of cereal crops. The current-value Lagrangian function takes the form 
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where the shadow prices of sector-specific capital are indicated with  ) 2 , 1 ( = i l
F
i and the shadow price 
of arable land is denoted by  .
F n  
  We may list the following conditions by the maximum principle 
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  The maximum-principle condition (15) and the equations of motion (17-19) indicate that the 
optimal investment rules in sector-specific capital are the same as at the social optimum (cf. equations 
(3), (6), (8) and (9)). Instead, the maximum-principle conditions for a farmer’s use of arable land and 
of herbicides differ from the social optimum, because the representative farmer does not take into 
account the beneficial environmental effects of rye cultivation nor the adverse effects of herbicides. 
This can be seen by comparing the equations (13), (14) and (16) with equations (1), (2) and (4). The 
organically-grown rye area will be smaller than socially optimal, and, since the land under agriculture 
is constant, the spring wheat area will be larger than socially optimal. Furthermore, at the 
representative farmer’s private optimum, the herbicides are used excessively from the social point of 
view. 
 
3.3 Representative hunter’s private optimum 
We approximate the Finnish situation and assume here that farmers do not charge for the rights to 
hunt
1. Therefore, hunters act as sole owners of the partridge stock, and that they maximise the net 
hunting benefits subject to the equation of motion for the grey partridge stock. 
                                                              
1 In the appendix we show the optimal solution whereby farmers have the property rights and they charge for hunting.   11
  The current-value Hamiltonian function is 
 
[ ] B X h a B e m X R H
H
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where the shadow price of the partridge stock is now indicated with  .
H m  
  The maximum-principle conditions are 
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  When comparing the above maximum-principle conditions with the maximum-principle 
conditions of the social planner, there is a difference between equations (10) and (22) because hunters 
do not take into account existence value and the fact that the natural biological stock also provides 
economic welfare to society above and beyond hunting. 
  We know from the maximum-principle condition (20) that hunters increase harvesting to the 
point where  . ) (
H
X m R = ⋅  Substituting the above result into (22) yields in the steady state 
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⋅ ⋅
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) ( ) (
) ( X B
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R e
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Since ) (⋅ B W  is not accounted for by hunters, the marginal benefits of delaying hunting are smaller 
compared with equation (11). Therefore, the steady-state hunting bag,  , ) ( B e X α − ⋅ =  is thus 
unoptimally large at the representative hunter’s private optimum and the steady-state partridge stock, 
the size of which is defined by the equation 
 
α ρ − ⋅ = ) ( B e   (23)
 
is too small compared with the social optimum, which is defined by the equation (12) (cf. Li et al., 
2001). 
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3.4 Corrected solutions 
In this section, we use market-based instruments to correct the externalities. There are three 
externalities in the framework presented: 1) The cultivation of rye positively affects the growth rate of 
the partridge stock. 2) The use of herbicides in crop production negatively affects the growth rate of 
the partridge stock and causes damage and disutility to humans. 3) Recreational hunting excessively 
reduces the level of the partridge stock and leads to loss of stock benefits. 
  By comparing the farmer’s private optimum with the social optimum, one may notice that the 
area under crop 1 is too small from a social point of view. Therefore, the government may subsidise 
the production of crop 1 and impose the crop-specific area payment s. Furthermore, when finding the 
private optimum, the farmer also neglects the social costs engendered by herbicide use. The social 
damages can be internalised by imposing a Pigouvian tax, t, to a farmer’s use of herbicides. 
  In the presence of acreage subsidy, s, and Pigouvian tax, t, the current-value Lagrangian function 
of the representative farmer’s maximisation problem becomes 
 
th sa h p I c I c h K a g p K a f p
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  The relevant maximum-principle conditions are 
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  By comparing the equations (24) – (26) with the corresponding maximum-principle conditions of 
the social optimum (1), (2) and (4), it is self-evident that the level of the acreage subsidy, s, depends 
on the product of the shadow price of the partridge stock and the marginal growth effect of  . 1 a  
Therefore, the socially optimal subsidy for the rye acreage has to be 
 
) (
1 ⋅ = a me s   (27)
 
  The similar reasoning results in that the optimal herbicide tax rate has to equal 
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) ( ) ( ⋅ − ⋅ = h h me D t   (28)
 
The herbicide tax internalises both direct and indirect effects of herbicide use. The latter consists of 
the reduced partridge productivity caused by the herbicides and it is weighted with the shadow price of 
the partridge stock. Furthermore, it is important to note that both the optimal first-best acreage subsidy 
(27) and the first-best herbicide tax (28) change over time, because they are functions of the shadow 
price of the partridge stock, which is a function of continuous time. 
  Let us next consider the representative hunter’s private optimum. To prevent over-exploitation of 
the partridge stock, the government may introduce a special hunting licence fee, z, for the grey 
partridge hunter, after which the hunter’s current-value Hamiltonian function becomes 
 
( ) [ ] B X h a B e m X z X R H
H
c α − − + − = , , ) ( 1  
 
  The relevant maximum-principle conditions are 
 
0 ) ( = − − ⋅ =
∂
∂ H
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C m z R
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∂
∂
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 After  substituting  z R m X
H − ⋅ = ) (  into (30), we have in the steady state 
 
[ ] ) ( ) ) ( ( 0 ⋅ − + − ⋅ = B X e z R ρ α  
 
Thus it is easy to see that the partridge hunting fee is made internal to the representative hunter’s 
decision, if we set 
 
m R z X = ⋅ = ) (   (31)
 
i.e., the hunting licence fee equals the shadow price of partridge stock. 
 
4. Empirical illustration 
In this section, we demonstrate our analytical findings with an empirical illustration of the impacts of 
farming and hunting decisions on the grey partridge population in Finland. First, we discuss the   14
population dynamics by developing a physical balance equation to illustrate grey partridge population 
relationships. We utilise statistics and previous valuation studies to approximate the use value of a 
bagged partridge and marginal social damages of herbicide use in monetary terms to find suitable 
estimates for m and  ). (⋅ h D  Our ultimate purpose is to assess the components of those policy 
instruments derived in the previous section to gain insight into how to estimate in monetary terms the 
optimal organic rye acreage subsidy and herbicide tax rates and the hunting licence fee. Finally, we 
discuss the benefits and costs of organic rye cultivation. 
 
4.1 Physical balance equation 
As mentioned, the size of the breeding population of the grey partridge in Finland is currently 4,000 
pairs (Väisänen et al., 1998). We presume that each pair has an average of four and half chicks of 
which 40% will survive. The annual net production of partridges is then  200 , 7 000 , 4 5 . 4 4 . 0 = × ×  
immature birds. 
  We assume that the natural production function of grey partridges is additively separable, and 
derive a linear approximation of the production function around the steady state 
 
h e a e B e e h a B ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅   (32)
 
The marginal product of a grey partridge,  ), (⋅ B e  is assumed to be 0.23 and the size of the steady-state 
breeding population, B, simply 8,000 partridges. 
  In the natural production function of grey partridges, the area under rye supports the growth of 
the grey partridge population. In the distribution area
2 of grey partridges, the average area under rye, 
, 1 a has been approximately 18,300 hectares during 1995-2003. Therefore, one additional rye hectare 
increases the annual net production of grey partridges (7,200 birds) on average by 
39 . 0 300 , 18 / 200 , 7 ) (
1 = = ⋅ a e bird/ha. This corresponds well with the documented partridge density in 
the UK during the first half of the 20
th century when pesticides were not used intensively (De Leo et 
al., 2004). 
  The use of herbicides decreases the supply of insect food and increases grey partridge chick 
mortality. Let us next suppose that the use of pesticides in Finland will be completely abolished. We 
assume that as a result of this, the fraction of surviving immature partridges will increase from 0.4 to 
0.5. This is based on a Danish study (Hald, 2002, referred in Schou et al., 2002) in which even 6 metre 
wide pesticide-free margins in cereal fields increased the survival of partridge chicks by 10 percentage 
points. As a result of the increase in the survival fraction, the net production of grey partridges will, in   15
the following year, increase from 7,200 birds to 9,000 birds (i.e. by 1,800 partridges per annum). In 
per hectare terms, this yields  10 . 0 300 , 18 / 800 , 1 ) ( = = ⋅ h e bird/ha. 
  The physical balance equation may be written in discrete time format as 
 
t t t h t a t B t t B X h e a e B e B B α − − − + = − + 1 1 1  
 
  In recent years, the annual partridge bag,  , t X  has been approximately 2,000 birds (Finnish Game 
and Fisheries Institute, 2004). If we assume that the natural mortality rate of grey partridges, α, is 0.65 
we may approximate the physical balance equation in the steady state as 
 
200 , 5 000 , 2 800 , 1 200 , 7 800 , 1 0 − − − + =  
 
4.2 Valuation of grey partridges and the marginal value of social damages of herbicides use 
Since there is no market price for a grey partridge, the minimum value of a bagged grey partridge is 
assumed to be €5. This estimate is based on the statistics of the Finnish Game and Fisheries Institute 
reporting annually the value of the meat received from the hunting bags. 
  Besides the value of meat, hunting has a significant recreational component. Using the contingent 
valuation method, Ovaskainen et al. (1992) found that the value of meat accounted for only 11-12% of 
the total hunting value of grouse (Tetraonidae). If this is generally true for all Finnish game birds, the 
recreational value of a bagged partridge would be about €45. This is in accordance with Rosenberger 
and Loomis (2001) who in their annotated bibliography reported net economic recreation values which 
ranged from $9.81 to $30.82 for waterfowl hunting. Therefore, we assume that the shadow price of an 
additional partridge is €45. 
  Also, the existence value
3 derived from the very presence of grey partridges might be significant, 
since the grey partridge is classified as a near-threatened species in Finland. Unfortunately there are no 
research results on this subject. We know, however, that the value of a grey partridge in violation of 
the hunting right is €34. This value is determined on the basis of the guideline values for live game 
ratified by the Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2001). 
  According to the results of the CV study by Siikamäki (1997), a Finnish consumer would be 
willing to pay annually €69 if the use of pesticides in agriculture was completely abolished. The total 
willingness to pay is then approximately €250 million. Since the total arable land area under 
cultivation in Finland is about 2.2 million hectares, this yields  114 ) ( = ⋅ h D €/ha. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
2 The range of the grey partridge covers the west coast of Finland and the southern and south-western parts of Finland 
(Tiainen and Pakkala, 1996). Thus the distribution area of grey partridge approximates to areas of six Employment and 
Economic Development Centres which comprise half of Finland's rye area and 86% of Finland's spring wheat area.   16
 
4.3 Optimal policy instruments 
The values for socially optimal policy measures are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Monetary values of the first-best policy instruments 
Rye subsidy rate, s  ha / 18 € 39 . 0 45 ) (
1 = × = ⋅ = a e m s
Herbicide tax rate, t  ha / 119 € ) 10 . 0 45 ( 114 ) ( ) ( = × + = ⋅ − ⋅ = h h e m D t
Hunting licence fee, z  bird / 45 € = = m z
 
Given that the shadow price of an additional partridge is €45 and that cultivation of rye enhances 
preservation of the grey partridge, we can approximate the optimal rye subsidy rate to be €18 per 
hectare. 
  The marginal value of direct adverse effects of pesticides is €114 per hectare (Siikamäki, 1997) 
and the marginal value of the indirect adverse effect of herbicides is €5 per hectare. Therefore, the 
socially optimal herbicide tax rate is €119 per hectare. 
  The optimal hunting licence fee is €45 per grey partridge, because we demonstrated that the 
optimal hunting licence fee equals the shadow price of grey partridge stock. 
 
4.4 Evaluation of non-market benefits and opportunity costs of organic rye cultivation 
We can approximate the non-market benefits of organic rye cultivation supporting the grey partridge 
population by using the figures derived above. According to our illustration, the organic rye area 
supports approximately a half (0.39 + 0.10) of a grey partridge per hectare. For that reason, if the use 
of herbicides in agriculture is abolished, the value of a rye hectare supporting grey partridge hunting is 
€22. In addition, the results obtained by Siikamäki (1997) indicate that the Finnish consumers are 
willing to pay €114 per hectare for the abolishment of the use of pesticides in agriculture. Therefore, 
the total non-market benefits of organic rye cultivation are €136 per hectare. 
  The non-market benefits should be compared with the opportunity costs of organic rye 
cultivation. According to the statistics produced by the Information Centre of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, the average producer prices of rye and spring wheat have been almost equal 
during Finland's EU membership. Instead, there has been a large difference between the productivity 
of these two cereals. During 1995-2003, the average market price of wheat (converted into the price 
level for 2000 by the agricultural price index, cereals (Statistics Finland, 2004)) has been €141.15 per 
tonne. In the same period, the average market price of rye has been €140.96 per tonne. In the 
distribution area of grey partridges, the average annual per hectare yield of spring wheat (weighted by 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
3 Equation (10) can be solved for WB(·) in the steady state, i.e. WB(·) = m(α+ρ-eB(·)). If we use the figures utilised above and   17
regional output volumes) has been 3,328 kg/ha. The corresponding figure for rye is 2,359 kg/ha. Since, 
according to the statistics produced by the Plant Production Inspection Centre, the hectare yields of rye 
in organic production during 1999-2002 have been approximately 67% of the yields in conventional 
production, we assume that the hectare yield of rye in organic production is 1,573 kg/ha. As both the 
price and the average per hectare yield of spring wheat are higher than those for rye, the farmer loses 
sales revenues amounting to €248 per hectare if he cultivates organic rye instead of conventionally 
cultivated spring wheat. 
  The calculated opportunity costs of organic rye cultivation are clearly greater than the estimated 
non-market benefits. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that we have focused our attention on the 
grey partridge. Since rye fields also offer food and shelter to pheasants and brown hares, the benefits 
received from those species should be included, when evaluating the welfare contribution of organic 
rye cultivation. However, when valuing individual species separately, one should be careful not to 
double-count the benefits. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We used the grey partridge as an indicator for wildlife in the economic model of cereals cultivation. 
We showed that agricultural intensification and specialisation to spring cereals cultivation cause the 
loss of wildlife and farmland biodiversity in the cereal ecosystem. More specifically, our model of 
cereal crop cultivation and grey partridge hunting indicated that the uncontrolled economy leads to too 
small a cultivation area of organic rye (i.e. crop that produces environmental benefits), an excessive 
use of herbicides in weed control, and overly large partridge hunting bags compared to the socially 
optimal situation. 
  The area under organic rye remains too small because farmers, when making their crop choices, 
do not consider that organic rye cultivation adds social welfare by increasing the reproduction rate of 
the partridge stock, from which humans derive welfare. Equally, farmers also ignore the harmful 
effects of herbicides. This implies welfare losses in the form of direct adverse effects to humans and 
reductions in hunting bags, as well as in other benefits derived from the partridge stock, because 
herbicides decrease the biological growth of the partridge population. We also demonstrated that the 
private optimum is realised at the lower partridge stock level and the hunting rate is excessively high, 
because hunters only maximise their net recreational hunting benefits but do not cater for the stock 
benefits that accrue for society at large. 
  The economic incentives that farmers and hunters face are inconsistent with biodiversity and 
wildlife conservation. Hence the above findings justify government intervention to internalise the 
externalities. Policy-makers should be able to reward farmers on the production of positive 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
assume that the rate of discount is 0.05, we have WB(·) = €45(0.65 + 0.05 – 0.23) = €21.   18
environmental benefits. Nowadays the agri-environmental support of the EU compensates 
predominantly the increased production costs and income losses that result from the implementation of 
policy measures. 
  The aim of our study was to derive and value in monetary terms the socially optimal policy 
instruments needed for correcting the market optimum. We are fully aware that we have made certain 
bold assumptions while deriving the results, but our purpose has been to demonstrate how the process 
of choosing the optimal levels for policy instruments should be carried out if the authorities were 
considering policy intervention. The procedure presented in this paper is also applicable for other 
situations where agricultural commodities are produced along with public goods. 
  In Finland, the annual area support to organic production has been €102.59 per hectare after a 
two-year conversion period during which the support is €147.16 per hectare. Instead, the herbicide use 
in conventional agriculture is not taxed. Our empirical demonstration suggests that the grey partridge 
alone justifies about 20 per cent of the organic production support. However, we also demonstrated 
that simply launching the area support for organic production does not provide the proper incentives 
for farmers, so a relatively high input tax on herbicides is also required. Since we have altogether three 
externalities, we also need three instruments to internalise them. Therefore, hunting of the grey 
partridge should be controlled by hunting licence fee which would become high if the size of the 
partridge population will approach a critically low, predetermined risk level. At present, there is no 
hunting licence fee for the grey partridge in Finland. The fee is collected only from the moose and 
deer hunters. 
  As the marginal value of the partridge stock is a function of time, optimal agri-environmental 
policy also includes dynamic characteristics. In addition, because of the joint production, the levels of 
different policy instruments are linked to each other. Therefore, the levels of rye subsidy, herbicide tax 
and hunting licence fee would vary according to the shadow price of the partridge stock. These 
features add complexity to agri-environmental policy design and implementation and make agri-
environmental policy and management of game resources integrated. 
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Appendix 
A situation in which hunting rights belong to farmers who charge for partridge hunting 
Let us suppose that the hunting rights of grey partridges belong to farmers who charge for the right to 
hunt. The partridges are then outputs for farmers and the area under rye and the amount of herbicides 
used are seen as inputs, since they affect the growth rate of partridges. 
  If we denote the hunting licence fee by  ,
X p  the profit maximisation problem of a representative 
farmer is 
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  The current-value Lagrangian function is 
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and the maximum-principle conditions are 
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including the equations of motion for the state and the costate variables   23
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  By comparing equations (A1) and (A2) to equations (1) and (2), it is self-evident that the areas 
under both cereals are similar to the social optimum. However, farmers use more herbicides than is 
socially optimal (equations (A4) and (4)) as they ignore the direct adverse effects of herbicides. 
  Farmers will set the partridge hunting licence fee,  ,
X p  lower than  ) (⋅ X R  in order to maximise 
their profits. From the social point of view, this will lead to an unoptimally low partridge stock and 
losses in stock benefits. 